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ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The Arrest Of Koivu Was Done In Good Faith And The Evidence Should Not Be
Suppressed Under Either The Fourth Amendment Or The Idaho Constitution

A.

Introduction
The district court concluded that, because the officers acted reasonably

when stopping Koivu for a traffic violation and arresting him based upon an
outstanding warrant, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule "would
probably apply" under a Fourth Amendment analysis.

(R., p. 56.)

It held,

however, that under Idaho law the methamphetamine found next to Koivu must
be suppressed.

This Court should overrule State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981,

842 P.2d 660 (1992), and hold where, as here, there has been no police
misconduct and the exclusion of the evidence serves no justifiable purpose, the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment also
applies to article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution.
Koivu asserts that the district court was correct in its ruling and that
Guzman was correctly decided and should not be overruled.

(Respondent's

brief, pp. 4-24.) He further asserts that even if this Court were to adopt a good

should nonetheless be excluded.
arguments are without merit.
should be overruled.

(Respondent's brief, pp. 24-31.)

Koivu's

A review of applicable law shows that Guzman

Exclusion of evidence in a case such as this, where the

conduct of police in executing an arrest warrant is objectively reasonable, does
not further the stated goals of the exclusionary rule.
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Further, the policy

advocated by Koivu discourages law enforcement from performing its duties and
encourages law enforcement to independently review lawful court orders.
Finally, if this Court adopts the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the
exception should apply in this case.

B.

This Court Should Adopt The Good Faith Exception To The Exclusionary
Rule
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that exclusion of

evidence where police officers relied in good faith on a judicial warrant does not
serve the purposes of the exclusionary rule.

In Leon the Court stated that

exclusion of evidence is a remedy that exacts "substantial social costs" as it
impedes the truth finding processes of the judicial system, which often results in
the guilty going free or receiving reduced sentences. United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 907 (1984). When applied to actions of law enforcement taken in good
faith or where the violation was minor, "the magnitude of the benefit conferred on
such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system" and
can generate disrespect for the law and the administration of justice. Leon, 468
U.S. 907-08.

Thus, the exclusionary rule should be applied only '"where its

remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served."' Leon, 468 U.S. at
910 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
The Court then applied this analysis of the costs of excluding evidence
against the benefits of deterring unconstitutional conduct. The Court reiterated
its standard of deference to a neutral and detached magistrate's finding of
probable cause. Leon, 468 U.S. at 913-14. That deference, however, does not
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extend to upholding the constitutionality of searches under three circumstances:
1) where the magistrate's determination of probable cause is based upon a
knowing or reckless falsehood by law enforcement; 2) where the magistrate was
not neutral and detached, but instead acted as "an adjunct law enforcement
officer"; and 3) where the affidavit before the magistrate does not provide a
substantial basis for finding probable cause. Leon, 468 U.S. at 914-15.
After rejecting the argument that exclusion will have a deterrent effect on
judicial officers, the Court reasoned that suppression for only the first of these
three potential flaws in a warrant would actually serve the purposes of the
exclusionary rule: deterrence of misconduct by law enforcement. Leon, 468 U.S.
at 915-18. Thus, assuming that the exclusionary rule ever has the desired effect
of discouraging misconduct, "it cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to
deter objectively reasonable police conduct."

Leon, 468 U.S. at 918-19.

Application of the exclusionary rule '"necessarily assumes that the police have
engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the
defendant of some right."' Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)).

Once an officer has obtained a warrant, there is

nothing more the officer can do to comply with the law and, therefore,
"[p]enalizing the officer for the magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot
logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations."
468 U.S. at 921.

Leon,

Thus, the Court held, "the marginal or nonexistent benefits

produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on
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a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of
exclusion." Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.
The good faith exception announced by the Court did not prevent
exclusion of evidence merely because a police officer obtained a warrant and
abided by its terms. Rather, stated the Court, an officer's reliance on a warrant
was not objectively reasonable where the magistrate was misled by information
the affiant knew was false or provided in reckless disregard for its truth; where
the issuing magistrate "wholly abandoned his judicial role"; where probable cause
was so lacking that "official belief in its existence [was] entirely unreasonable";
and where the warrant was so facially deficient that the executing officers could
not reasonably presume that it was valid. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23.
The reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United States is persuasive,
and should be followed. Exclusion of evidence in effect sanctions the state and
prevents judicial truth-finding.

Sanctioning the executive for the actions of the

judiciary merely lets the guilty go free without significantly protecting the
innocent.
Koivu argues that the exclusionary rule in Idaho serves a broader purpose
than under the Constitution of the United States, and that allowing the use of
evidence seized pursuant to a defective arrest warrant is contrary to this broader
purpose even where the police acted reasonably. Specifically, he argues that in
Idaho exclusion encourages a thorough warrant issuing process, preserves
judicial integrity, and prevents an additional constitutional violation by allowing
the court to consider the evidence. (Respondent's brief, pp . 5-10, 23-24.) He
4

also asserts that suppression is the "only remedy available."

(Respondent's

brief, pp. 21-23 (emphasis in original).) Besides being persuasively discounted
by the United States Supreme Court, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984), these arguments lack logical merit. Koivu first argues that suppression
will deter judges from erroneous issuances of warrants. (Respondent's brief, pp.
5-7.) He offers no persuasive rationale for why the threat of suppression will lead
to better decisions by Judges. On the contrary, the systemic incentives of judges
are so different than those of the police that the threat of suppression will not
create any additional incentive for judges to make correct rulings.

Judges, as

opposed to police officers, have no vested interest in the investigation of
suspects or seeing potential defendants convicted at trial.

If a judge acquires

such an interest, then the exclusionary rule likely applies. Leon, 468 U.S. 922-23
(exclusion applies where judge abandons judicial role). Because judges would
not be "punished" by exclusion, and are much more likely to follow the law than
police because they have no vested interest in criminal investigation or
prosecution, exclusion of evidence for an error by a judge would have minimal or
no deterrent effect on judges.
Further, suppression of the evidence discovered in this case in no way
encourages a more thorough warrant-issuing process. Unlike the typical search
warrant-issuing scenario, where the court's signature on a warrant is designed to
initiate a search for evidence, here, the court likely did not contemplate that the
issuance of the warrant in the case before it would result in the discovery of
evidence and the initiation of an entirely new criminal case. Because the warrant
5

in this case was not for the search or seizure of evidence, it is highly unlikely that
the threat of suppression of evidence would have played any role in the judge's
actions.
Koivu's claim that exclusion protects judicial integrity also does not
withstand analysis. Exclusion of competent evidence subverts a court's primary
truth-seeking function.

In addition, the argument that introduction of evidence

obtained by judicial error (as opposed to police misconduct) violates a
defendant's rights a second time assumes that the defendant has an absolute
right to prevent the use of evidence obtained because of a rights violation. Such
an assumption is belied by the fact that such evidence may be used in a variety
of circumstances (such as rebuttal in certain circumstances) and that courts will
not suppress evidence merely because the police would not have obtained it "but
for" the viol at ion. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 909-11 .
Further, Koivu's claim that exclusion is the only remedy for the violation
misunderstands the purpose and history of the exclusionary rule. Application of
the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to "cure the invasion of the
defendant's rights which he has already suffered."
465, 540 (1976).

Stone v. Powell , 428 U.S.

Rather, the rule "operates as 'a judicially created remedy

designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."' Leon,
468 U.S. at 906 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
''As with any remedial device, application of the exclusionary rule properly has
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been restricted to those situations in which its remedial purpose is effectively
advanced." Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987).
Exclusion is a remedy and not a right. Evidence is often admitted despite
being obtained in contravention of an individual's constitutional rights. Examples
include: a defendant convicted in state court may not obtain federal habeas
corpus relief on the grounds that illegally obtained evidence was used in his
criminal trial; exclusion does not extend to grand jury proceedings; illegally
obtained evidence is admissible in civil trials; and exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence is not required where a particular defendant had no standing to contest
the legality of the search or seizure.

Leon, 468 U.S. at 909-10.

In addition,

illegally obtained evidence is sometimes admissible in criminal trials under
certain circumstances, such as in rebuttal. Leon, 468 U.S. at 910.
Further, this Court has adopted additional exceptions to the exclusionary
rule, including the independent source exception, the inevitable discovery
doctrine, and the attenuated basis exception.
490, 36 P.3d 1278 (2001 ).

See State v. Stuart, 136 Idaho

Each of these exceptions rightly focuses on

deterrence of police misconduct and permits admission of evidence despite the
fact that a constitutional violation occurred.

kl

All of these exceptions belie the

argument that a defendant is entitled to a remedy for an improper search or
seizure.
An even more stark example of how defendants are not entitled to a
remedy for an improper search and seizure is found in the law holding that an
officer's

reasonable

belief that

his

actions
7

are

proper may,

in

some

circumstances, justify his actions even where the officer's belief is reasonably
based on facts that are not true.

An officer's probable cause determination

based on a reasonable mistake of fact does not render an arrest improper even if
he would have lacked probable cause had he known the true facts.

Illinois v.

Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1990); State v. Buhler, 137 Idaho 685,688, 52
P.3d 329, 332 (Ct. App. 2002).

In addition, in Franks v. Delaware, the United

States Supreme Court established the following rule, which was adopted in
Idaho:
[W]here the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing
that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless
disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant
affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the
finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a
hearing be held at the defendant's request.
438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978); State v. Lindner, 100 Idaho 37, 41,592 P.2d 852,
856 (1979). The defendant bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the warrant affidavit contains intentional or reckless falsehoods.
State v. Peterson, 133 Idaho 44, 47, 981 P.2d 1154, 1157 (Ct. App . 1999).
Under Franks, mere negligence in the course of acquiring a warrant on the part
of law enforcement does not provide a sufficient basis to rescind a warrant and
render a search or arrest invalid . The focus is, again, on police misconduct in
obtaining a warrant. See Lindner, 100 Idaho at 41, 592 P.2d at 256 ("Appellants
failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that the discrepancy was included in
the affidavit intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth . To the contrary,
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the record indicates the discrepancy was merely an oversight and not
intentional.").
It is illogical that under Franks, evidence may be admitted when law
enforcement is negligent or careless (but not reckless) in obtaining a warrant, but
that under Guzman, evidence must be suppressed when law enforcement is
blameless in executing that warrant. In this case, there was absolutely no police
misconduct in obtaining or executing the warrant, nor was law enforcement
negligent in executing the warrant.

(See Stipulations For Hearing On

Defendant's Motion To Suppress.) The evidence should not be excluded merely
because a warrant was issued that was subsequently recalled.
Finally, Koivu is advocating a policy that encourages law enforcement to
make an independent review of a warrant and to use its own judgment in
determining if a facially valid warrant is, in fact, valid. Such a policy encourages
law enforcement to

second-guess

orders

of the

court

and

to

decide

independently which orders it will or will not follow. This is a poor policy. Davis
v. United States,_ U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2429 (2011 ), explains:
all that exclusion would deter in this case is conscientious police
work. Responsible law-enforcement officers will take care to learn
what is required of them under Fourth Amendment precedent and
will conform their conduct to these rules. But by the same token,
when binding appellate precedent specifically authorizes a
particular police practice, well-trained officers will and should use
that tool to fulfill their crime-detection and public-safety
responsibilities. An officer who conducts a search in reliance on
binding appellate precedent does more than act as a reasonable
officer would and should act under the circumstances.
The
deterrent effect of exclusion in such a case can only be to
discourage the officer from doing his duty.
9

That is not the kind of deterrence the exclusionary rule seeks
to foster. We have stated before, and we reaffirm today, that the
harsh sanction of exclusion should not be applied to deter
objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.
(internal citations, quotations and alterations omitted, emphasis original). Like in
Davis, here, "all that exclusion would deter in this case is conscientious police
work" and the effect of exclusion in this case "can only be to discourage the
officer from doing his duty" by encouraging him to second-guess judicial orders
and to make independent determinations of their legality.
The United States Supreme Court explained

how suppression of

competent evidence where the police have acted reasonably in a Constitutional
sense does not advance legitimate interests to the extent that it outweighs the
Leon, 468 U.S. 897.

Koivu has

responded to the Court's reasoned opinion with mere denials.

The state

harm to the court's truth-finding function.

requests this Court to hold that where there has been no police misconduct, the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.

C.

If This Court Adopts The Good Faith Exception To The Exclusionary Rule,
Exclusion Of The Evidence Is Not Warranted In This Case
Koivu asserts that even if this Court adopts the good faith exception to the

exclusionary

rule,

the

good

faith

exception

does

not apply

given the

circumstances in this case. (Respondent's brief, p. 24.) The district court has
already determined that, under federal law, the good faith exception would
probably apply. (R., p. 56.) The district court is correct.
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The state and defense stipulated below that "neither law enforcement
officers nor prosecutors had any involvement in the issuance of the Warrant of
Attachment," and that the deputies, "having reasonably relied upon the validity of
both confirmed warrants, placed both Koivu and the other warranted occupant
under arrest and transported them to [jail]."

(Stipulations For Hearing On

Defendant's Motion To Suppress, pp. 1-2.) Because the officers were not
involved in the issuance of the attachment warrant and reasonably relied on the
validity of that warrant in arresting Koivu, the good faith exception applies.
Leon held that the exclusionary rule does not apply when the police
conduct a search in "objectively reasonable reliance" on a warrant later held to
be invalid. Leon,
See
also,
- 468 U.S. 897. -- Davis v. United States,

-

U.S.

-

,

131 S.Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011) ("Leon ... held that the exclusionary rule does not
apply when the police conduct a search in 'opjectively reasonable reliance' on a
warrant later held invalid."). Here, no facts suggest that law enforcement's
reliance on the warrant was anything but "objectively reasonable."

To the

contrary, the parties stipulated that the officers acted in reasonable reliance on
the validity of the warrant. (Stipulations, p. 3.) Thus, the exclusionary rule does
not apply under the Fourth Amendment in this case.
Koivu argues that defects in the warrant process show a lack of
reasonable reliance on the warrant.

(Respondent's brief, pp. 25-29.)

This

argument is without merit.
An officer is no longer acting in good faith reliance on a warrant where
defects in the warrant process show that the officer had "no reasonable grounds
11

for believing that the warrant was properly issued." Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. Such
circumstances that might show that reliance on the warrant was unreasonable
include knowing or reckless submission of false information by the police to
obtain the warrant; complete abandonment of the judicial role through
participation in the search; no basis for a reasonable belief that probable cause
existed; or facial deficiencies in the warrant itself. ~; see also State v. Johnson,
108 Idaho 619, 626, 701 P.2d 239, 246 (Ct. App. 1985) (cited Respondent's
brief, p. 26).
Koivu's argument, that his allegations of defects in the warrant process
show a lack of objective reasonable reliance on the warrant, is directly contrary to
the stipulated facts. The parties stipulated that the officers "reasonably relied on
the validity of both confirmed warrants." (Stipulations, p. 3.) The touchstone of
the good faith test is whether the officers acted in "objectively reasonable
reliance" on the warrant.

Davis, _

U.S. _ , 131 S.Ct. at 2428; Herring v.

United States, 555 U.S. 135, 142 (2009) (the "objectively reasonable reliance"
standard called "perhaps confusingly" good faith).

Because the defects in the

warrant process alleged by Koivu do not show a lack of objectively reasonable
reliance on the warrants, and because Koivu stipulated below that the officers
reasonably relied on the warrants, Koivu's argument on appeal is meritless.
The state requests this Court to overrule Guzman and hold that where, as
here, there has been no police misconduct, the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule applies.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's
order granting Koivu's motion to suppress.
DATED this 29th day of August, 2011.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 29th day of August, 2011, served a
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